























ABSTRACT: In this paper, we will try to confront Quine’s and Davidson’s holistic position 
through Davidson’s thesis of the mental as a non-ontological category. In this regard, since 
Davidson came to this position through the thesis of the mental as a decidedly conceptual 
category, we will try to show how this approach does not, nevertheless, rule out the 
possibility of its interpretation in ontological terms. However, in what follows we will draw 
attention to the fact that the mental can be interpreted so that it proves to be immune to 
ontologizing in Quine’s sense. This would be the evidence of different ways, which are not 
necessarily compatible, to argue for Davidson’s central thesis - the thesis about holistic 
character of the mental - as well as, which is closely related, a certain difference that exists 
between Davidson’s view of the mental as a conceptual category on the one hand, and a 
holistic category on the other. 





The subject of this paper is a version of holism developed in the work of the American 
philosopher Donald Davidson, known as mental holism. As it is one of many holistic views 
that emerged in the 20th century philosophy, the question is, inter alia, what is the difference 
between this view and Quine’s holistic approach known as semantic holism. The question is 
all the more relevant because Davidson was strongly influenced by Quine, so in order to give 
an answer to it we will try to contrast these two approaches, emphasizing the problem that 
concerns both of them in our opinion. 
Namely, according to his own testimony, Quine believed that one of the main tasks of 
philosophy was an attempt to answer the question ‘What there is?’, or ‘What kinds of things 
exist?’, so it can be said that, at least for Quine, ontological questions were a matter of central 
interest. On the other hand, Davidson often readdressed in his later texts the problem of 
thought and the conditions necessary for it to be attributed as a property. It follows that, when 
it can be considered a property, or when it can justifiably be attributed to an object, it thus 
becomes part of the content of an ontology, specifically, ontology that would include in its 
inventory properties and predicates, inter alia. The problem is, however, that if thought were 
an ontological entity, then other contents of the mental would seem to be equally entitled to 
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this status; however, Davidson categorically and repeatedly points out that “the mental is not 
ontological but conceptual category” (Davidson 2004a: 114). 
This alone might be sufficient to question whether we have anything to show for, and 
that all we should do in order to present the peculiarity of Davidson’s view compared to 
Quine’s holistic program, is apparently to present Davidson’s arguments for his view. In a 
word, it is likely that these arguments would be equally valid when it comes to thought, 
which is, no doubt, just one manifestation of the mental. 
However, what hopefully makes our endeavor non-trivial is that although its existence 
is not denied, it remains uncertain what place thought has within Davidson’s conception of 
the mental, which is why the question of its (ontological) status remains open. On the other 
hand, that the entire problem has considerable weight is evidenced by the fact that although 
thought is not mental, strictly speaking, it actually shares the same extension with it, opening 
the possibility, as we shall see, of interpreting Davidson’s view from the perspective of 
Quine’s theoretical position, and thus of questioning his thesis of the mental as an essentially 
conceptual category. In short, the question is what it is that we would claim to exist that is 
neither ontological nor conceptual category; in order to give an answer to it, we will start 
with the way Davidson approaches the problem of thought in general, or, in his words, with 
what thought requires. 
 
Conditions for thought according to Davidson 
 
When it comes to conditions that should be met in order to justifiably speak of the 
existence of thought, it should be said straight away that Davidson’s starting point on this 
matter – as he himself points out – is ‘completely Cartesian’; that is, like Descartes, Davidson 
does not doubt at any point that thought exists: “I start with the fact that we cannot doubt the 
existence of thought, and ask what follows. We cannot doubt the existence of thought 
because even a doubt is a thought, and it is impossible to have a doubt without knowing that 
it is a doubt. A great deal follows from the fact that thought exists” (Davidson 2004c: 6). 
However, although he believes that we cannot reasonably doubt the existence of our own 
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thought, Davidson also believes that we must be extremely careful when trying to determine 
what would be the evidence against its existence in others.1 
In a word, Davidson does not rule out the possibility that, for example, animals can 
think, and in this regard he makes a number of observations that could support this thesis: 
“Animals show by their behavior that they are making fine distinctions, and many of the 
things they discriminate we do to. They recognize individual people and other animals, 
distinguish among various sorts of animals, find their way back to places they have been 
before, and can learn all sorts of tricks” (Davidson 2004e: 136). However, he also expresses a 
doubt that they thus have thought processes, primarily because they do not have any kind of 
concept.  
Namely, in order not to be tempted to treat “simple tendencies to eat berries, or to seek 
warmth and avoid cold (…) as having the concept”, Davidson thinks that we have to assume 
that “to have a concept is to judge and believe that certain items fall under the concept. If we 
do not make this condition on having a concept (...) it would be to lose track of the 
fundamental distinction between a mindless disposition to respond differentially to the 
members of a class of stimuli, and disposition to respond to those items as members of that 
class” (Ibid. 137-138). It follows that, even though they can “see and hear and smell all sorts 
of things”, animals “do not perceive that anything is the case”, which is for Davidson a 
sufficient reason for our doubt about the existence of thought processes to be justified in their 
case: “Some non-human animals can learn a great deal, but they do not learn that something 
is true” (Ibid., 136). 
This fact is extremely important to us because it reveals the leading concept in 
Davidson’s approach to the problem of thought. Namely, it is the concept of truth, and 
Davidson concludes that thought could be attributed as a property to an object only if the 
given object had this concept, that is, if it could distinguish cases in which a certain belief is 
true from those in which it is not: “To know the truth conditions of a proposition, one must 
 
1 We should note that Davidson is referring here to an old problem concerning our knowledge of others’ mental 
states; however, it is important to say that Davidson does not at any time display skepticism about the 
conclusion that others, to whom we normally ascribe the ability to think, really have mental states similar to 
ours (and it is this doubt that would represent the original version of the skeptical paradox regarding others’ 
mental states); in fact, he believes that this assumption is necessary and that in retrospect, it is one of the 
preconditions of our own mental activities. Namely, what he wonders is what justifies us not to recognize that 
some objects have this ability? 
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have the concept of truth. There is no more central concept than that of truth, since having 
any concept requires that we know what it would be for that concept to apply to something” 
(Davidson 2004c: 10).2 
However, before we continue, it should be said that Davidson’s skepticism, although 
consistent, is nevertheless limited in this regard, which is best evidenced by the fact that he 
does not doubt the possibility that any randomly chosen object can think, the ability that we 
would not otherwise be inclined to attribute to it. 
Namely, for an object or a creature even to be considered as a candidate for having 
thoughts, the requirement that Davidson sets is that they act in the world, that is, they would 
have to show indication of having the so-called propositional attitudes such as desires, 
intentions and beliefs, regardless of whether they actually have them or not. If this is the case 
– as it undoubtedly is when it comes to higher animals – there remains the last obstacle to go 
from the candidate for having thought to the circle of its rightful holders, that they really have 
beliefs about their actions, which is nothing but having the belief that something is the case. 
As we have seen, animals do not fulfill this requirement because they do not have the concept 
of truth.3 
However, as we shall soon see, there are objects that can demonstrate to have this 
concept but Davidson also denies them the ability to think, so we can say that his insistence 
on the concept of truth as the most important one is more regulatory in nature, that is, this 
concept could be understood as such only in terms of serving the harmonization of other 
concepts; for just as a belief cannot be a belief if it is ‘not understood what it means if it were 
 
2 Thus, the condition for thought – in the sense in which Davidson uses this term – is that a being or an object to 
which we would be willing to attribute this ability must have the concept of truth, and since its presence can 
only be assumed in cases in which it makes sense to speak of a mistake, but “mistake not only as seen from an 
intelligent observer’s point of view, but as seen from a creature’s point of view“ (Davidson 2004c: 8), hence the 
reason why animals cannot be considered even in principle as holders of this disposition. 
 
3 Namely, although, based on the behavior in observable circumstances, it could be concluded that they have 
something akin to beliefs, desires or intentions, or propositional attitudes, animals do not have the concept of 
truth; since the content of a belief is primarily determined by the possibility of its truth or falsity, hence the 
conclusion that they do not have propositional attitudes either, and thus not even the rudiments of what we 
would call thought processes: “A creature that has a concept knows that the concept applies to things 
independently of what it believes. A creature that cannot entertain the thought that it may be wrong has no 
concepts, no thoughts” (Davidson 2004e: 141). 
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wrong’, it is also not clear what would be the purpose of the concept of truth and what it 
would even mean that it is central if there were no propositional attitudes such as beliefs. 
Although Davidson might disagree with us on this point, there is an important thesis that we 
have taken from him after all, that the concept of truth and propositional attitudes are in fact 
closely intertwined, and that the lack of any of them would be a sufficient reason to doubt 
that the other is present. Generally speaking, this insight is the basis of Davidson’s strategy 
for not recognizing the ability to think in objects that seemingly possess the concept of truth, 
viz. computers. 
It should be said straight away that addressing the problem of thinking in machines, 
thanks to the ability to have language and the concept of truth, is completely in line with 
Davidson's skepticism and the standards he requires; just like he does not reject a priori the 
thesis that animals could think, in the same vein he does not doubt that it would be possible to 
make a thinking artifact: “There is no reason why an artificial object could not think, reason, 
make decisions, act, have beliefs, desires and intentions. But how much like us must an 
artifact be, and in what ways, to qualify as having thoughts?” (Davidson 2004b: 87). 
Davidson approaches this problem through something he calls the method of addition and 
detachment. Namely, the question he raises is “what must we add to the most thoughtful 
objects we know - computers - before we can say that they have thoughts”; on the other hand, 
the question is “what can we detach from a person and still count him or her as a thinking 
creature” (Ibid.). 
As for the second matter, Davidson reaches the conclusion that might support the thesis 
that machines could think, or in any case, the conclusion that does not necessarily state that 
they could not; it is that the properties of an object such as its origin, the material of which it 
is made, and its size or shape are irrelevant when it comes to its mental abilities, that is, these 
are the things that we could ignore, or, as he says, detach from an object and still consider it a 
thinking one. However, the question of what should be added to it so that it can be said that it 
is capable of thought is, according to Davidson, much more difficult than the previous one, 
but by addressing the previous one, he already gives an indication of where we should look 
for an answer. 
Specifically, what we could not detach from an object and still consider it a thinking 
one is primarily its history, in Davidson’s view: “Thoughts require a history. Not only must 
an object capable of thought be capable of learning: it must have learned a great deal. A 
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creature or object cannot have a thought about stars, squid or sawdust unless that thought 
somehow traces back causally to appropriate samples” (Ibid, 88-89). Having this in mind, it 
seems that Davidson’s conclusion that a history is what machines lack can be used as a 
working one, that is, it is a history that should be added to them in order to consider them 
capable of thought: “A brain, or brain-like object, whatever its other powers, could not be 
said to have any ordinary thoughts about ordinary objects unless there was a history of causal 
interactions with objects of the same sorts. This does not show, of course, that such an object 
could not be an artifact. It does show that an artifact cannot have thoughts unless it can learn 
and has learned from causal interactions with the world” (Ibid.). 
However, we have to note that all this is still very general, and after all, it is not clear 
why a machine could not simulate having a history in the way that Davidson assumes.  In that 
case, it seems that the basis for denying it the ability to think would also disappear, and 
Davidson would probably be the last to try something like that (this is not quite true, as we 
shall see below). However, Davidson draws our attention to the fact that the behavior of 
machines, or more precisely, their output is still such that it shows strict determinism in its 
relation to the input, which is evidenced by the fact that they can usually be good only in one 
task, such as playing chess.4 
Namely, if we take just the above ability of a machine to play chess, not only does 
Davidson doubt that if the machine demonstrates this ability we can conclude that it also has 
thought processes, he actually questions the justification of our belief that it is able to play 
chess at all: “It is not enough for a computer, or a robot under its direction, to be good in a 
single task, such as playing chess. An enormous supporting repertoire is necessary. (...) Think 
what it takes to play chess. In order to play chess, it is necessary to want to win, or at least to 
understand the concept of winning. To understand the concept of winning, it is not enough to 
know what it is to win at chess. It is necessary to have a general conception of what it means 
to win in any activity” (Ibid.). 
 
4 This idea will come to the fore in Davidson’s dealing with the Turing test, which examines the ability of a 
machine to display behavior that would not differ from the behavior of a human being. However, one of the key 
weaknesses of this type of test, in Davidson’s view, is that it is set so that it “eliminates the possibility of telling 
whether a creature or machine thinks without determining what it thinks. (...) So in the test, any evidence that 
thinking is going on will have to be the evidence that particular thoughts are present” (Davidson 2004d:  80). 
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Therefore, Davidson believes that we cannot speak of any thought as long as the objects 
in question are not able to demonstrate, in addition to demonstrating certain actions – even if 
they were the most rational ones – that they also have an understanding of these actions. In 
other words, ‘before we say a creature believes the sun is now shining, we should ask for 
evidence that the creature understands what it is for the sun to be shining’; this would in our 
example mean that, before we assume that the computer believes that it plays chess (wins at 
it, makes the most rational of all moves, etc.), it would have to understand what it means to 
play chess, and there would be evidence for this only in the case it is “able to demonstrate 
that it can believe falsely” that it plays chess (Davidson 2004c: 12), and as long as it is not, 
we will not have any grounds to attribute the ability to think to it. 
 
Thought and the mental 
 
Thus, although the concept of truth may be the most significant – or, as Davidson 
would put it, central – it is only one in a series of concepts that a creature would need to have 
for it to be said that it is capable of thought. Other concepts, so to speak, would be so-called 
propositional attitudes, which primarily include desires, beliefs and intentions, and which, as 
we have seen, come into play in Davidson’s approach to the problem of thought in machines. 
However, apart from believing that thoughts, as well as beliefs and desires, “can exist only in 
the context of a very rich conceptual system” (Ibid.) which is absent both in animals and 
machines, Davidson will go a step further and argue that propositional attitudes “exist only if 
one resorts to mentalistic interpretation that has a holistic character, since given mental states 
can only be understood in correlation with other mental states of a person” (Govedarica 2006: 
206). 
In other words, “for the attribution of beliefs to be possible”, Davidson and his 
followers believe that “not only must we assume the overall rationality of cognizers, but also 
we must continually evaluate and re-evaluate the putative beliefs of a cognizer in their 
individual relationship to one another and other propositional attitudes” (Kim 1988: 393). 
This is the usual way to emphasize the non-ontological, or more precisely, conceptual 
character of the mental in Davidson’s work that we pointed out in the introduction; however, 
having in mind the discussion that we addressed in the previous section, there is a problem 
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here that, in our view, brings into question the above thesis, which is why we need to address 
it in more detail. 
Namely, although Davidson’s conclusion, that thought can justifiably be attributed only 
in cases implying very rich conceptual systems, seems plausible, and perhaps the only 
possible alternative to the counterintuitive thesis that what we would consider to be the 
evidence of having it could be reduced to the ability to make valid inferences; it would mean 
that the object to which we would attribute this ability is equipped with appropriate means of 
quantification logic or capable of operating with logical variables, and the positive side of 
this approach is that thought as a concept is relieved of the ballast of other mental contents 
such as desires, intentions, and beliefs. Generally speaking, this is something that would, in a 
sense, be desirable for Davidson, primarily because thought, as he presented it, is practically 
impossible to distinguish from the mental as a whole. 
In other words, although he argues that the mental is the result of a mix of different 
concepts that typically exist only if mentalistic interpretation is resorted to, it seems that, 
since they share the same extension, this applies equally to thought, which is why it is not 
clear what is its specificity compared to the mental: “Domain in which thought can occur is 
fairly complex. It is a domain each of us inhabits, but one we have good reason to suppose is 
inhabited by no other animal on earth, and certainly by no machine” (Davidson 2004e: 140). 
On the other hand, not only is thought in Davidson’s work not part of the mental in the way 
that beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. are, it also does not figure as another name for it (at least 
not explicitly), evidenced by the fact, inter alia, that he treats it mostly as a separate problem. 
Having this in mind, it seems that there are two possibilities.  
Namely, the concept of thought in Davidson’s work is either a redundant concept in 
which there is nothing that is not already included in the mental, or it has a certain value that 
should be discovered or determined more precisely. In this regard, our view is that 
Davidson’s approach to thought is by no means redundant, primarily because equating it with 
the mental has a positive result that his approach to the mental in general makes it resistant to 
some kind of radical skepticism – which is, in our opinion, the main reason why he takes it 
into consideration. 
In other words, we believe that Davidson intended to get his theory a certain 
epistemological integrity by addressing the problem of thought, which is evidenced by the 
fact that although he starts from the same hypothesis as the proponents of the traditional 
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approach in epistemology, that is, from the Cartesian cogito, the consequences are completely 
different.5 However, even though in this way he may succeed in providing his program with 
the character of epistemological, the negative consequence of this equating is that it brings 
into question the mental as an essentially conceptual (non-ontological) category. 
Namely, since by determining what makes thought possible, we would necessarily 
postulate the existence of some entity that is thought which is in Davidson’s work the result 
of a combination of several properties and concepts that although enable it, do not constitute 
its identity, but part of the identity of the mental, we believe that this makes room for 
interpreting Davidson’s theoretical position from the perspective of Quine’s conceptual 
framework. In a word, instead of a conceptual category, the mental could prove to be an 
ontological category, through the concept of thought with which it shares the same extension; 
the possibility of such an interpretation can be presented by reformulating Quine’s famous 
slogan into a question that he could ask Davidson: “What kind of entity we could claim to 
exist that had no identity?”. 
 
Ontological status of the mental 
 
Therefore, although thought is not ‘mental’, strictly speaking, we have seen that it can 
be attributed only when we can speak of the presence of the mental, that is, these two 
concepts are practically coextensive. With this in mind, it seems that if Quine could show that 
the concept of thought could be covered by his usual way of approaching ontological 
problems, or his strategy for answering the question “What exists”, he could argue that the 
mental is in fact an ontological category, given that it shares the same extension with it, 
 
5 Although we cannot examine this thesis more thoroughly here, we can state arguments for it, including that the 
aim of Davidson’s speculation regarding thought is not to prove wrong those who argue for the view that an 
animal or machine can think, despite evidence to the contrary, or that in principle, we will never know for sure 
whether they can think or not, as it ultimately follows from the traditional approach and other approaches in 
epistemology he leans towards. Namely, “point is that to have even one thought – one belief or desire – they 
would have to have a very great many other thoughts and desires” (Davidson 2004b: 89-90), hence it follows 
that Davidson does not at any point answer the question what thought is, but what makes thought possible, 
which is fundamentally different and the fact that not only refers to them, but also limits skepticism about 
(other’s) mental states. 
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contrary to Davidson who argues that it is conceptual. Generally speaking, we believe that 
this is precisely the case, as we will try to show in what follows. 
Quine’s approach to ontological problems or his strategy for answering the question 
“What there is?” is closely related to his overall theoretical position known as semantic 
holism, and although Quine’s holistic thesis is often referred to in literature as Duhem-Quine 
thesis, there is a certain difference between their views that is not negligible. This difference 
primarily concerns Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity that is, as we shall see, nothing but 
the other side of holism that he argues for. 
Namely, Duhem’s holistic thesis primarily concerns the relationship of the whole 
physical theory to its individual statements and hypotheses, and the most important insight 
that Duhem has gained is that these individual statements are impossible to observe 
independently of each other, but only in the context of the whole theory: “To seek to separate 
each of the hypotheses of theoretical physics from the other assumptions upon which this 
science rests, in order to subject it in isolation to the control of observation, is to pursue a 
chimera; for the realization and interpretation of no matter what experiment in physics imply 
adherence to whole set of theoretical propositions” (Duhem 2006: 199-200). However, 
recognizing that there can be inconsistent or even contradictory physical theories that may be 
empirically adequate (i.e. empirically equivalent), Quine argues that they also depend on a 
broader, already existing set of references that will function as the final instance in 
determining which entities enter the “domain of variables over which we quantify”, in short, 
which entities exist. 
In other words, theories implied by Duhem’s holism would be much narrower than 
those implied by Quine’s, as evidenced by the fact that the reality of the entities they 
postulate are primarily due to certain broader frameworks of references. Since Quine will 
identify these frameworks primarily with (different) languages, he will also argue that 
“ontological controversy should tend into controversy over language” (Quine 1948: 35), 
because the language in which a theory is formulated already contains an ontology, although 
it may be “primitively adopted and ultimately inscrutable” (Quine 1968: 201). However, it 
should be noted that for Quine a language, in addition to presupposing an ontological 
framework, also presupposes a certain theoretical or conceptual framework, and since there is 
no way we can abandon the framework of a language to take some impartial position in 
answering a question such as “What there is?”, Quine argues that “it makes no sense to say 
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what the objects of a theory are, absolutely speaking, but how one theory of objects is 
interpretable or reinterpretable in another” (Ibid.). 
Therefore, although for Quine language is not physical science, strictly speaking, it 
certainly is a theory, that is, language itself is the background theory “within which we can 
show how some subordinate theory, whose universe is some portion of the background 
universe, can by reinterpretation be reduced to another subordinate theory whose universe is 
some lesser portion“ (Ibid., 202).6 If we go back to our main discussion, the question is what 
would be the implications of such a viewpoint on Davidson’s view, that is, how can 
Davidson’s approach be interpreted from the perspective of Quine's conceptual framework? 
Namely, we have seen that Davidson’s conclusion is that in certain cases thought 
undoubtedly exists, which would mean from the perspective of Quine’s theoretical position 
that it enters the domain of variables over which we quantify. Having this in mind, if Quine 
were to abandon the counterintuitive thesis that it could be reduced to the ability to make 
valid inferences, which machines could also have, as we have said, it seems that he could 
treat thought in the same way he treated all entities for which we do not have clear, 
behavioral identity criteria, such as beliefs: “In each particular case, knowing the 
circumstances, we may be able to say something in other terms that would be no less useful 
as an aid to transacting some business in hand; but we can hope for no verbal equivalent of 'a 
believes that p' even for given 'a' and 'p', that is independent of the circumstances under 
which it may have been said that a believes that p” (Quine 1969: 146). 
In other words, it seems that Quine could have such an attitude concerning the 
ontological status of belief also regarding the ontological status of thought, or that thought 
could be treated in a similar way he treated propositional attitudes in general – i.e. as a 
primitive, common sense concept taken from language, or as he puts it, “halfentity”. On the 
other hand, since we have seen that thought can be attributed only when we can speak of the 
presence of the mental, it is not clear why what applies to thought would not equally apply to 
 
6 Quine reached the conclusion that we cannot speak in an absolute sense of the objects that theories postulate 
primarily by realizing their underdetermination by empirical evidence in general. However, since the thesis of 
underdetermination will also imply cases in which interpretations that Quine speaks of are possible only 
provided that ontological assumptions of a theory are read one into another, it will equally apply, in addition to 
subordinate theories, to so-called background theories or languages, which supports the view that we have put 




the mental, which would show, contrary to Davidson’s view and his interpreters’, that it is not 
necessarily a conceptual category.7 
Therefore, since there is nothing about thought that is not already contained in the 
mental, it seems that the thesis that the mental is a conceptual (non-ontological) category is 
not guaranteed at all; because if we argue that it is ontological, we could easily reach, through 
the concept of thought with which it shares the same extension, other contents of the mental, 
such as beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. However, although in this way we might meet the 
conditions to treat the mental as an ontological category, it seems that Davidson and his 
followers could also argue that its true content would still elude us.  
Namely, given the thesis that “the semantic contents of attitudes and beliefs determine 
their relations to one another and to the world in ways that meet at least rough standards of 
consistency and correctness”, and that “unless such standards are met to an adequate degree, 
nothing can count as being a belief, a pro-attitude, or an intention” (Davidson 2004a: 114), 
Davidson’s thesis of the conceptual character of the mental could be invoked here. According 
to this thesis, in order to individualize something as a belief at all, we would have to resort to 
mentalistic interpretation presupposing that “total system of subject’s beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes is largely and essentially rational and coherent“, that is, “we must 
construct an 'interpretive theory that simultaneously assigns meanings to his utterances and 
attributes to him beliefs and other propositional attitudes” (Kim 1988: 393). Although this is 
something we can do in principle, it is assumed that we will then treat the mental not as an 
ontological, but as a conceptual category, which entails that Quine’s actual attitude about 
belief – that we transferred to thought and the mental in general – he could actually have 
about thought, while beliefs and other propositional contents that depend on mentalistic 
interpretation would still elude him. 
Therefore, since entities such as beliefs, desires, and intentions are subject to a different 
logic than the one we are trying to impose here by interpreting them from Quine’s theoretical 
perspective, if we were in a position to individualize the mental through thought, it seems that 
we would still not be able to individualize its contents, which ultimately brings into question 
 
7 Although there is no doubt that we ascribe here a particular view to Quine he was wise enough not to advocate, 
having in mind all the above, it seems that there is no compelling reason why he could not put forward a view 
about thought that he normally held about all entities for which we do not have clear behavioral identity criteria, 
regardless of the fact that he did not do so in reality. 
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both the individuation of the mental and the possibility of its interpretation in ontological 
categories. In other words, it seems that, at best, it is Davidson’s word against Quine’s, with 
the advantage of Davidson’s here because the criterion for the individuation of propositional 
attitudes that he offered takes into account the presumed specificity of the mental sphere that 
hardly anyone would deny today, which Davidson first gave a consistent form.8 However, the 
fact that would, nevertheless, enable the individuation of even propositional attitudes in 
Quine’s manner is that we would not have to deny the thesis of the mental as a conceptual 
category; this is primarily because, through the concept of thought with which it shares the 
same extension, we would de facto be in a position to treat the contents that make it possible 
– which make up the mental – in the same way that Quine treated the contents of physical 
theories – as entities that postulate certain individual theories subordinated to a single 
background theory or language. 
Namely, given the requirement that we cannot speak in an absolute sense of what 
would be objects of a theory, but how a theory of objects can be interpreted or reinterpreted 
within another theory, we should bear in mind that the interpretation of Davidson’s view 
from the perspective of Quine’s theoretical position would not be enabled by the fact that the 
mental, if it is ontological, cannot be a conceptual category, but that although it is not 
physical, through the concept of thought with which it shares the same extension, Davidson’s 
theory can still be treated in the way that Quine treated these theories – that is, as theories 
that are primarily subordinated to a broader, already existing set of references, a language.9 
 
8 In this respect, apart from the fact that mental entities can only be spoken of as half-entities, it should be said 
that Quine largely denied any specificity of the mental sphere, which he explained by the fact that, just like 
physical objects, entities such as beliefs, desires, and intentions are ‘out in the open’, which is why they are 
ultimately ‘accessible to the intersubjective techniques of study‘ (Gibson 1988: 54). Although this objectivity, or 
more precisely, intersubjectivity of the mental is by no means something that Davidson would question, due to 
the above specificity of the sphere to which they belong, he thought, as we have seen, that access to mental 
entities is not and cannot be as direct and immediate as Quine thought. 
 
9 In this way, it seems that Davidson’s theory is on the same level as other theories that use mentalistic 
conceptual framework (such as, above all, various psychological theories), and since they quantify over half-
entities, it is well below the level of physical theories. However, what is important here is not a relatively low 
status that Davidson’s theory would have if viewed from the perspective of Quine’s, but above all the fact that it 
would prove to be a theory that could be treated as subordinated, which is why it is possible, ultimately, to 




However, although it seems that we have successfully interpreted Davidson’s view from the 
perspective of Quine’s theoretical position – and thus subordinated it in a sense – we shall see 
below how it is still possible to conceptualize the mental in the way that would prove it to be 
immune to ontologizing in Quine’s sense. However, not only we will need, as we shall see, a 
different interpretation of holism that it implies, but primarily the introduction of certain 
additional assumptions, the most significant one being Davidson’s thesis of the non-existence 
of thing that has such a decisive role in Quine’s approach: “I conclude that there is no such 
thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists 
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with” 
(Davidson 2008: 595). 
 
Linguistic nihilism and attributive dualism 
 
Therefore, like most Davidson’s interpreters, we ultimately believe that Quine’s 
semantic holism and Davidson’s holism of the mental are mostly incommensurable views, 
although the reason is not, as it is commonly believed, that there is a gap between 
physicalism and mentalism – because we have seen that, when relevant conditions are met, 
Quine’s approach is equally successful in dealing with both of them10 – but between 
fundamentally different holistic programs: the first that acknowledges the existence of 
language and in which it represents the final instance for determining what exists, and the 
second that denies its existence, which was inaugurated by Davidson himself. This thesis, 
which we will call hereafter the thesis of linguistic nihilism, is closely related to the idea of 
the context of linguistic communication that is extremely important to Davidson, and is part 
of his general theory of meaning and action. 
Namely, having in mind the variable character of that context as one of its most 
important features, Davidson points out that in practice, for the sake of successful 
communication, we are constantly forced to formulate so-called passing theories: “We may 
 
10 Since Quine thought that there is ultimately continuity between science, philosophy, and common sense, even 
though he undoubtedly put forward views that would support it, here we do not accept the objection that for him 
Davidson’s theory would not even be a theory, and especially not a pseudo-theory, because we do not see what 
the determinant ‘pseudo’ would refer to in that case, given the above. 
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say that linguistic ability is the ability to converge on a passing theory from time to time (...). 
But if we do say this, than we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary 
notion of a language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and 
knowing our way around in the world generally” (Ibid.). On the other hand, Davidson also 
believes that this insight, generally speaking, can be used to build arguments that would 
question the existence of language in general: “Perhaps we can give content to the idea of two 
people 'having the same language' by saying that they tend to converge on passing theories; 
degree or relative frequency of convergence would then be a measure of similarity of 
language. What use can we find, however, for the concept of language? What could hold that 
any theory on which a speaker and interpreter converge is a language; but then there would 
be a new language for every unexpected turn in the conversation, and languages could not be 
learned and no one would want to master most of them” (Ibid., 594). 
Therefore, Davidson’s main argument for the thesis of the non-existence of language is 
that the boundaries of language are impossible to determine, as evidenced by our formulation 
of so-called passing theories, which we use to constantly create ‘new’ languages as a 
precondition for even being in a position to successfully interpret others’ statements and 
actions. However, just as Davidson, by drawing attention to the variability of the context of 
linguistic communication may have good reasons for the claim that language does not exist, 
referring primarily to his ontological argument, we should note that Quine has no weaker 
reasons for the thesis that language actually exists. 
In other words, just as the thesis that the mental is a conceptual category is non-
guaranteed, it seems that this also applies to the thesis of linguistic nihilism, which means 
that it is once again Quine’s word against Davidson’s; however, the advantage of Quine’s 
view would now be that, if we were to assume that language exists, through the concept of 
thought with which it shares the same extension, we would de facto be in a position to claim 
that the mental it is not necessarily a conceptual (non-ontological) category. With this in 
mind, in order to present Davidson’s position as independent of Quine’s, it seems that we 
would have to show how the thesis of linguistic nihilism, which would ultimately take away 
the legitimacy from Quine’s demands, and mental holism support each other. However, the 
problem is that this will not be possible as long as we see the mental as Davidson and his 
interpreters see it, not only because referring to a network of propositional attitudes and the 
concept of truth leaves open the possibility of interpreting it in ontological categories, but 
primarily because it is not clear how Davidson can claim that language does not exist and at 
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the same time argue for mentalistic (radical) interpretation, which has as its precondition the 
very assumption about the existence of (different) languages.11 
In short, not only do we have to show how the ideas of linguistic nihilism and mental 
holism support each other, but it is quite certain that we will have to offer such an 
interpretation of Davidson’s holism that will not imply referring to propositional attitudes. 
We believe that the problem that initiated our discussion, primarily the problem of thought in 
machines, could help us in this. 
Namely, we have seen that Davidson came to the conclusion that a history is what 
machines lack to be considered capable of thought; on the other hand, we have also seen that 
this is closely related to the existence of propositional attitudes in general, because just as 
machines do not have propositional attitudes or precisely because of it (as evidenced by the 
example we have given, in which a computer is not able to adopt the concept of winning for 
the simple reason that it does not have a certain propositional attitude, viz., a desire to win), 
they do not have a history as Davidson interprets it. However, since we have said that they 
could simulate both having a history and having propositional attitudes, Davidson is 
eventually forced to reformulate the problem. Namely, “why wouldn't knowledge of the 
design and program of this computer tell us what it is thinking and explain its actions?” 
(Davidson 2004b: 93). Davidson’s answer to this question is that it would not, and the reason 
he gives is the fact that a program is fully characterized by its formal, i.e. syntactic properties: 
“Knowing the program is enough to explain why the device produces the marks or sounds or 
pictures it does given an input described in similarly abstract terms. This knowing does not 
touch on questions of meaning, of reference to the outside world, of truth conditions, for 
these are semantics concepts” (Ibid.). 
 
11 Namely, what Davidson calls mentalistic interpretation is actually a generalization of his idea of radical 
interpretation, according to which in order to gain a “foothold in our subject’s realm of meanings and intentional 
states”, we would have to assume that its entire “cognitive output is regulated and constrained by norms of 
rationality” (Kim 1988: 392). However, while this is true in cases in which radical interpretation applies, which 
involve the interaction between subjects who speak different languages, transition from it to universally valid 
mentalistic interpretation does not seem as smooth as Davidson and his interpreters suggest, which is one of the 
ways to present the problem we are dealing with in this paper. For more detailed information on radical 




This Davidson’s observation is extremely important to us, which is why we will return 
to it later. However, it would be good to observe beforehand that, in rejecting the thesis that 
machines could think even if they would largely show the abilities that do not differ from the 
abilities of human beings, Davidson now refers to two new concepts rather than propositional 
attitudes. 
These are semantics and syntax that traditionally denote different types of research 
programs, where semantics primarily denotes a discipline that deals with certain relations 
between linguistic expressions and objects (or ‘states of affairs’) to which these expressions 
‘refer’, while syntax is the study of the rules we use to construct statements, in short, their 
structure. However, in Davidson’s case there is a possibility of a new approach to these 
concepts, where semantics would no longer be “that portion of a grammar which attempts to 
classify all words of a language into parts of speech, according to what the words mean or 
designate” (Tarski 2008: 100), or the research program name, but the property of an object 
that will figure as a precondition for its ability to interpret and reinterpret both its own 
actions and statements and those of other (thinking) beings with whom it interacts. 
Therefore, it seems that Davidson nevertheless gave certain indications that the 
argument against the possibility of thought processes in machines could be based on the 
difference that exists between semantics and syntax, even if he did not attempt to ultimately 
base it on it, which would in this case imply that these concepts are treated as properties. 
However, while semantics would primarily be the property that would allow an object to 
‘connect words with the world’, or to formulate what Davidson calls passing theories, we 
argue for an approach that would equate having it with having the mental in general.12 The 
reason is that we believe that, in rejecting the possibility of interpreting Davidson’s view 
from the perspective of Quine’s conceptual framework, it would be an interpretation that 
 
12 Although this equating might seem to be a considerable impoverishment and simplification of the idea of the 
mental, it should be said that the so-called properties dualism on which it would be based has been recognized 
long ago in Davidson’s work. Thus, some theorists think that it “partly jeopardizes his monistic conception, 
because the traditional dualism of material and spiritual substance is replaced with a new and inexplicable 
dualism of mental and physical properties “ (Lazović 1995: 32). Other have seen it as “the possibility that in 
discussing the ontological status of mental phenomena, postulating some mysterious properties is avoided, 
assuming the existence of some spiritual substance that would play the causal role that mental states play in 
human behavior” (Grahek 1990: 195). Although these issues are undoubtedly important, they go beyond our 
current interests, so we will not dwell on them. It is important to point out that we interpret the above dualism 
using the concepts of semantics and syntax. 
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would finally provide us with what is necessary – i.e. demonstrate that the ideas of mental 
holism on the one hand, and linguistic nihilism on the other are not only closely related, but 
also imply each other. However, in order to do all that, it is necessary to add another 
Davidson’s concept to our argument. 
Namely, seeing a thinking object as an object that is primarily able to understand that 
something is the case, in addition to having the ability to formulate the so-called passing 
theories, Davidson treats this object primarily as one that in the context of linguistic 
competence and communication should also have prior preparedness to interpret what the 
speaker utters (Davidson 2008: 592), which he calls prior theory. If we take a machine as an 
example of the object that could have indeed this prior preparedness for an output that 
Davidson calls prior theory, the question is what would it really have, given that it has no 
possibility of formulating passing theories or in any case a very limited one? 
Namely, since it has no possibility of formulating so-called passing theories, it seems 
that what a machine would have as a prior theory would be just a property of no importance 
in the context of coping skills and linguistic communication in general, which we would thus 
call syntax. However, Davidson argues that it should not be inferred that the ability to 
formulate passing theories is all that is necessary to justifiably claim to have the mental; this 
is primarily because, even in the case of a machine that would fully imitate man, there would 
be a categorical difference between what we would call a prior theory, and what would seem 
to be its passing theories. 
In other words, since knowledge of the program or prior theory is always syntactic, 
Davidson believes that machines cannot have the mental, even if their abilities would not 
differ from the abilities of human beings. While there is no doubt that various, very 
convincing objections can be easily made to this conclusion, we will try to show that 
Davidson is nevertheless on the right track by giving the example of a machine that would 
display a limited ability to deliver output – which is, in our opinion, the only relevant 
scenario here – except that we will not claim that it does not have the mental, but that it does 
not have any prior theory. In short, although in both cases it makes sense to speak in terms of 
input and output, we believe that only in the case of beings that have prior theory, it makes 




Namely, although input and output are concepts that are always correlated, we believe 
that this relation would be fundamentally different in the above two cases, primarily because 
the output of machines would indicate the existence of a certain specificity in their prior 
theory that would manifest itself as a defect in the context of linguistic competence and 
communication. However, we should keep in mind that this defect would not consist in its 
limitations, or better yet in this case, definiteness for which we would never have to get 
evidence based on its behavior, but in the impossibility of switching from delivering a simple 
output to formulating so-called passing theories. Hence, prior theory that it would have 
would be instrumental in this, and the reason would be the fact that, in the context of 
linguistic competence and communication, this theory would already have to imply not 
preparedness to deliver some sort of output as such, but an interpretation.  
Therefore, we believe that the very possibility of formulating passing theories implies if 
not the thesis of non-existence of the so-called prior theories, then certainly of their 
indeterminacy; this entails that not only the concept of passing theory, but also the concept of 
prior theory is a distinctly semantic concept that can only be attributed to a being that has the 
mental. However, apart from supporting the thesis of its holistic character, it is important to 
us that this interpretation equally convincingly supports the thesis that would ultimately take 
away the legitimacy from Quine’s demands – i.e. the thesis of the non-existence of language 
in general. 
Namely, although they do not refer to the same thing, strictly speaking, it seems that in 
order to show that language exists, Quine would have to show that his idea of the background 
theory and Davidson’s of the prior theory can be equated. However, that it cannot be the case 
is evidenced by the fact that, even though semantics is inherent to a being, this theory will in 
practice prove to be something so indeterminately more than what a machine can have, so to 
speak of it as a language becomes meaningless. On the other hand, this indeterminacy of the 
prior theory or language on which Davidson bases his arguments for its non-existence is 
something that also concerns thinking beings, but they are able to overcome it, since 
semantics is inherent to them, or at least to constantly strive for it which they do, by 








Therefore, if we were to abandon the assumption that language does not exist, but keep 
the idea of the variability of the context of linguistic communication that no one would 
seriously question, justification for the thesis of its non-existence would no longer be found 
in the fact that it is impossible to determine the boundaries of language, but above all in the 
fact that the opposite view would be in conflict with the thesis of the holistic character of the 
mental. However, we should keep in mind that this thesis, like the previous one, need not be 
presupposed in advance, for it proved to be a necessary consequence of the interpretation we 
have offered, which entails the most important conclusion that we reached in this paper. 
Namely, although the thesis about the holistic character of the mental is no doubt the 
most significant in Davidson’s work, we have seen that it can be reached in a number of 
different and not necessarily compatible ways. This is evidenced by the fact that the mental 
can be interpreted, using Davidson’s means, in such a way that it proves to be immune to 
ontologizing in Quine’s sense, but this also requires an approach that will not imply referring 
to a network of the concept of truth and propositional attitudes, in short, which will not imply 
the thesis of the mental as a conceptual category. The primary reason for this is that, unlike 
the interpretation that we argued for, in which the mental was seen through the concept of 
semantics as a property, this interpretation does not imply, but a priori presupposes the thesis 
of its holistic character: “Norms of rationality holistically constrain our propositional 
attitudes in virtue of their contents“, and these propositional attitudes have the content they 
have “because of its location in a network of other beliefs and propositional attitudes“(Kim 
1988: 393). 
In other words, by comparing Davidson’s and Quine’s holistic positions, we reached 
the conclusion that there is a difference between Davidson’s approach to the mental as a 
conceptual category on the one hand, and the holistic one on the other, because while the first 
thesis requires the other, we have seen that this is not true the other way around. Moreover, 
since it seems that the very idea of its holistic character would have to imply the idea of the 
mental as an autonomous whole phenomenologically speaking, we believe that to approach it 
as a conceptual category reveals a certain weakness in Davidson’s thesis of the mental as a 
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holistic category, as evidenced by the fact that it leaves open the possibility of interpreting it 
in ontological terms. This, however, does not mean that our view is that Davidson and his 
followers should abandon this thesis completely, only that – since they cannot use it against 


















13 Davidson’s thesis of the mental as a conceptual category is in our opinion the most convincing when he uses 
it to show that, since they have different sources of evidence, the mental cannot be reduced to the physical (see: 
Davidson, Donald, ‘Mental Events’). However, we believe that this Davidson’s anti-reductionism should by no 
means be understood as a form of anti-ontologism, for although Quine no doubt saw physical science as an 
ontological ideal – or perhaps better, as the ‘ultimate ontological parameter’ – it is also clear that his criterion 
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